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The Gramm-Rudman Act mandated the sequestration cf over 11
billion previously approved FY-1986 budget dollars. DOD financial
managers then :zund themselves faced with tough decisions in
order to fulfill missions with less resources than expected. The
fiscal environment facing DOD organizations resembled that faced
by local governments in California following the passage of
Proposition 13 in 1978. A survey of DOD financial managers was
conducted to determine how these managers were reacting to their
reduced budgets. Responses were compared to actions taken by
California managers subsequent to Proposition 13 to gauge the
potential of the strategies now being employed to cope with
Gramm-Rudman. This study indicates that DOD managers have
begun cutting back, but have not yet made the fundamental shift
from maintaining their previous organization to embracing a new,
leaner one which can function with significantly fewer resources.
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The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985
was signed by President Reagan on 12 December 1985, and, along
with a resolution raising the ceiling on the National Debt to
$2,078,700,000,000 and a separate resolution condemning the
murder of Leon Klinghoffer aboard the MV Achille Lauro, became
Public Law 99-177 [P.ef. 1] . The law has since become popularly
know as "Gramm-Rudman" in honor of its two principal Senate
sponsors, Phil Gramm, (D-TX) , and Warren Rudman (R-NH) ?/
After the rhetoric on the merits and demerits of forced deficit
reduction, after the predictions of gloom and doom if this or that
legislation is passed or defeated, and after the mandates to reduce
spending have filtered down through the agencies, to the
departments, and ultimately, to an activity's financial manager,
then and only then is the Herculean task, that of reducing the
budget without crippling the organization, begun. Financial
managers at the operating level are the ones who must ultimately
wrestle with reduced resources and provide the means to
accomplish more -with less.-/
A. THE THESIS/
This thesis examines the manner in which a group of
Department of Defense financial managers coped with abrupt
termination of resources following the loss cf their portion of the
$3 3 billion of Operations and Maintenance budget authority
sequestered from the FY-86 budget. The strategies employed in
meeting the challenge of reduced operating budgets, the manner in
which hard budgeting decisions were made, and the
communications processes overlaying the entire management effort
will be examined. Since Gramm-Rudman portends an upcoming
period of scarce resources, the planning processes to cope with the
upcoming era of retrenchment were also surveyed S
Gramm-Rudman's abrupt termination of a budgeted, ^nd
therefore expected, resource stream is not unprecedented The
actions and reactions of the DOD manager will be compared i< ..-
responses of managers in California cities and counties following the
passage of Proposition 13 in 1978. "While the gene:::, objectives,
and implementation of each measure vary, the environment,
government organizations receiving fewer funds than anticipated, is
common to both Proposition IT and Gramm-Rudman. Due to the
similarities involved, one can gauge the DOD managers' attempts at
cutting back by comparing their responses with those observed
when local California managers attempted to cope with Propositi m
13. S
B. THE QUESTIONNAIRE
This thesis contributes to DOD management by providing
information regarding the manner in which DOD financial
8
managers faced the impact of Gramm-Rudman mandate
'-'->'" A questionnaire was used to survey financial managers on a
broad range :: topics relevant to sutback management to
j jtermin 2 the way managers coped. A copy of the questionnaire,
and forwarding letter, is appended, respondents were requested tc
remain anonymous to ensure candid feedback/"
Information was solicited from 44 commands with I"7 responses
received Although the great majority of respondents were from
: Navy commands, responses were obtained from other DOE
agencies and components as well. Questionnaires were distribu
over "he summer of 1986, and responses received from mid-July
through mid-Septernber The response "window" is significant
since some oi later respondents had received unanticipated ?nc
year funding, by the time they responded, therefore biasmg some
of their responses.'/'
t . . .. .r. i
Before comparing the responses to both Gramm-Rudman a
tc Proposition 13 a review u Gramm-Rudman is required. In
examining Gramm-Rudman, the impact on the Department of
Defense and the navy's Operations and Maintenance accounts will
be highlighted. A brief discussion of "cutback management " and
the impact of Proposition 13 on California managers will set the
stage for an examination of how selected DOD financial managers
have coped with Gramm-Rudman in FY-86. Finally, the
responses of DOD managers will be compared with those in
California following Proposition 13, and estimates made regardir
the state of the cutback management process
v
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:: THE GRAMM-RUDMAN ACT
Gramm-Rudman provides a means to balance the federal
budget by gradually bringing expenses in line with revenues. This
is accomplished, as illustrated in Table 1, by specifying deficit
targets (Maximum Deficit Amount (MDA)) beginning in FY-86 an::
running through FY-91 with the ultimate goal of reducing the
budget deficit to $0 by the end of FY-91.
TABLE i
GRAMM-RUDMAN MAXIMUM DEFICIT AMOUNTS
FY-86 FY-67 FY-88 FY-89 FY-90 FY-91
$171.9 $144.0 $108.0 $72.0 $36.0 $0
The act requires the President to submit a budget which does
not exceed the MDA for the applicable fiscal year. Furthermore,
Congressional budget resolutions must also be within the maximum
deficit amount of the applicable fiscal year. The Congressional
restraints are imposed in both the House and the Senate by points
of order. [Rei. 2: pp. 1-2]
If the budget passed by Congress and signed by the President
dees not fall within $10 billion dollars of the deficit reduction
targets, as calculated by both the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) , automatic
reductions are "triggered" to eliminate the deficit excess by the
process of sequestration.
Though the primary "trigger" of the bill, that being the
Comptroller General of the United States specifying the deficit
excess and detailing r he required sequestrations to the President
has been ruled unconstitutional, there are alternatives aval - .
including one built into the law, to allow the necessary reduction
to be mandated to achieve or at least progress toward a zerc
deficit [Red. 2: p. 20]
A dUDGET AUTHORITY AND OUTLAYS
rl,To understand the manner in which expenses are reauc .
is necessary to differentiate between budget authority, the figure
in the budget which is actually reduced by sequestration, and
outlays, the actual expenses which, when in excess of revenues,
cause a deficit. Outlays are the actual amount of dollar: spenl
a particular activity, in a given year. On the other hand, bud;-;
authority is granted to federal agencies in an appropriation: bill
and entitles the agency to enter into commitments that result in
immediate or future spending.
Normally, budget authority represents the maximum amount
of new spending commitments the agency can make
Consequently, outlays for a given year can result from budget
authority granted during that year, as well as budget authority
carried over from a previous appropriation. [Ref. 3: pp. 150-155]
Budget authority represents total cost, while outlays represent the
amount which is actually spent during the year [Ref. 3:p 3]
The relationship between outlays and budget authority differs
significantly depending on the nature of the account This
relationship, or "spend out rate" is instrumental in determining the
amount of budget authority to be sequestered to achieve a set leve
of cut lay savings.
5. COMPUTING THE AMOUNT TO 5E SEQUESTERED
Regardless of who initiates the sequestration procedure. th:
,-i-.ir:-f:,--r ,- - - ,- ,- ,:c ic
non-d"^™
is eliminated by sequestering from bom defense and
efense accounts which are eligible for sequestration.
Approximately 72t7 of the federal budget is exempt from
sequestration, so the accounts which are eligible will be cut more
deeply than if all accounts were eligible. [Ref. 4: p. 4]
Initially, on< half the deficit excess, that amount of deficit
over the target, is assigned to DOD and the other half to non-DOI
accounts. For FY-88, $11.7 billion was determined to be the
required outlay reduction, with $5.85 billion assigned to both
defense and non-defense accounts.
Next, the total amount of outlay savings which can be
achieved by not implementing automatic spending increases in a
variety of retirement and disability programs is calculated, if thi«
amount is less than one half the deficit excess, one half of this
outlay savings is treated as a defense sequestration and half as
non-defense sequestrations. The elimination of automatic spending
increases tends to reduce the amount by which defense and non-
defense accounts must be sequestered to meet the deficit target
[Ref. 5 pp 6-8] For the FY-86 cuts, $.497 billion dollars was
attributed to bom defense and non-defense accounts as a result
not implementing the automatic increases. An additional $ 045
billion was attributed to non-defense accounts due to the
elimination of 'certain non-defense automatic spending incr
[Kel . b. p. 4oJ .
The appropriate percentage of funds to be sequestered from the
ible accounts is derived by dividing the necessary outlay
reductions to reach the deficit target (the remaining amount of
both defense and non-defense sequestrations) by the estimated
amount of the sequesterable budget The resulting percentages are
then applied to both the defense and non-defense accounts [Ret
5: p. 8] For the FY-86 cuts, the remaining Defense budget
reduction of 35 353 billion, was divided by the estimated outlays
from the sequesterable budget authority and unobligated balances,
$109.3 billion, to achieve a 4.9% "across the board" reduction
[Ref. 6:p. 50]
.
C. PROGRAM, PROJECT, OR ACTIVITY
Gramm Rudman requires that in implementing sequestration.
the President cut each "program, project, or activity" (PPAj,
within a budget account by the same percentage. "Program.
14
project and activity" has no statutory definition Gramm-Rudman
specifics that for accounts funded through annual appropriations,
PPA will be denned in 'he appropriation biii each year. The PPA
definitions for the 19S6 cuts were treated somewhat differently
since most appropriations bills had already been passed prior to tj -
passstge of Gramm-Rudman.
For defense accounts, however, the amounts cut from each
F?A are (were for FY-S6) these as specified in the OMB 8, CE "
Tire iters report, the GAO report, and ultimately, in r he
President's sequestration order [Ref. 2: p. 15].
A manager ::' an individual PPA will have discretion, within
that PPA. in meeting the across the board reductions [Ref. 4: p.
4]. Congress does, however, insist that the Department of Defense
carry out sequestration in a manner not adversely affecting or
altering Congressional policies and priorities as established for the
Department of Defense. [Ref. 7: p. 340]
D. THE RESULTS CF SEQUESTRATION
A summary of Department of Defense Sequestrations for FY-S6
is provided in Table 2. It is important to note the relationships
between the amount of budget authority cut and the savings in
outlays. Cuts in military personnel budget authority resulted in a
one for one reduction in outlays while at the opposite end of the
TABLE 2
[Ref. 5:p. lb1 A"1
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spectrum, cuts in procurement yielded an outlay savings of slight!
less than 14/_ of the budget authority cut.
The treatment of the Military Personnel account during the
1986 sequestration also deserves additional attention. For FY --96
only , the President was provided the flexibility of exempting some
or ail of the PPA's within the military personnel account from
sequestration. In fact, 93% of the military personnel account,
approximately $61 billion, was exempted from the sequestration.
The effect of this exemption was to lov/er the sequesterable budget
base, thus reducing the "denominator" in the "% to be cut across
the board equation." By exempting such a large percentage of the
fnilitary personnel appropriation irom the sequesterabie base, the
percentage cut from eligible DOD accounts rose from 3.1% to 4.95S.
A smaller base of sequesterable resources had to yield the required
amount of outlay savings, as evident from Table 3.
TABLE 3
FISCAL 1986 DEFENSE: ACROSS THE BOARD CUT






















Since the savings had to come from budget accounts with
zlow^r spend out rates, more budget authority had to be cut
($13.8 vs. $10.7). [Ref. 2:p. 16]
E. THE EFFECTS OF SEQUESTRATION ON THE QUA ACCOUNTS
The following tables illustrate how the Operations and
Maintenance (O&M) reductions were achieved for both DOD and for
the Navy. As has been illustrated in Table 4, while budget
authority v/as cut uniformly in FY-86 by 4.3%, outlay reductions
in the O&M account resulted in $2.9 of the $5.4 billion dollar
17
savings (54%) . The column labeled estimate represents the
average of the OMB and CBO estimates for FY-86 sequesterable
resources Tine sequester column represents 4.9% of the estimated
amount of sequesterable resources.
TABLE 4
[Ref. 5: p. 42]
't- — »- »OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE (DOD.)
(figures are in $000's)
estimate- sequester
budget authority 73,493,536 3,846, 183
unobligated balance 1,320,000 64,680
outlay 59,917,744 2,935,969
Similarly, Table 5 illustrates the manner in which the am
of 0&sM,Nctvy to be sequestered was derived.
TABLE 5
[Ref. 5:p. 41]
OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE (NAVY)
(figures are in $000's)
estimate sequester
budget authority 24,477,071 1,199,376
unobligated balance 117,000 5,733
outlay 17,633,017 864,018
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F. THE RESULTANT FUNDING SHORTFALL
The fine points of Gramm-Rudman, or the manner in which
the exact amount of O&M was to be sequestered, were not,
however, the immediate concern to the activity comptroller or
financial manager. In FY-86, the DOD manager found he had
fewer resources with which to implement and carry out his
programs than he had anticipated . The same predicament will
continue. The difficulty that Gramm-Rudman presents is not so
much that the law requires cutting back, but that it requires
cutting back into existing and ongoing programs. It requires
cutting back into the "base."
In the case of the Navy's Operations and Maintenance funding,
over $800 million which had been planned, programmed, and
budgeted for ov^r the preceding two years had to be cut from 01
March until 30 September. Clearly, financial managers had
difficult decisions to make, and not only for FY-86. The trend
was ciear. The mood of the President, Congress, and the
American people indicated the difficult issue of deficit reduction was
finally being addressed, and possibly resolved.
The resultant process can be summed up by the views of the
Republican members of the Joint Economic Committee:
The process of deficit reduction is a headache on a grand scale.
But the prospects for economic health . . . make a program of
deficit reduction now a vital investment [Ref. 8: p. l]
.
To reduce the deficit without raising revenues (taxes),
expenses must be cut, whether by sequestration. Congressional
19
action to reduce the President's budget, or by the President
himself.
Ultimately, regardless of the mechanism or the final dollar
amount, the financial manager will :::ed himself placed in an
environment of resource scarcity, with ever-increasing and
competing programs, priorities, and clientele for the ever-
dwindling budget dollar. As long as taxes, and hence, revenue, are
not increased, the only manner in which the deficit can be
reduced will be to spend less.
With a climate of resource scarcity looming over the
remainder of the 1980's and probably to the end of this century,
it is time to look at new and innovative ways to manage with
less. It is time to address cutback management.
20
in. cutback management
Taxpayer revolts such as Proposition 13 in California, the near
zollapss into bankruptcy of New York City's government in the late
1%0's, or most recently, concrete measures to reduce the federal
deficit, emphasize the link between political economy and the
practices of public management.
Public management strategies have traditionally been predicated
on the assumption that the oi-ganization's budget will grow and
tna: its services and programs will continue to exoand. These
aEsumptions dominate the thinking and planning in organizations
which rely on annual incremental additions to their budgetary
base. These annual additions have provided the means to fund
near constant expansion mandated by the growth of clientele,
legislated programs, and local initiatives. [Ref. 9: p. 316]
Prestige and power are signs of a growing organization. In this
environment, public managers often have little incentive to
conserve resources. Resources managers save will probably be
used to make up the deficits of those who are less efficient within
that organization. Managers who don't spend money this year,
will not see the money next. [Ref. 10: p. 182] Managers must
spend all their resources to show that their budgets must be
increased, incrementally, in succeeding years.
The evermore prevalent decline of resources available to public
organizations, whether en the national, state or local level, is
attributable to a continuing imbalance between public revenues and
expenditures. The specter of scarce resources is not an isolated
problem, but one which will accompany us into the next century.
Academics have, over the last 20 years, been working to
come to grips with the effects of resource scarcity on public
management . They have been developing strategies for the desi
and management of public organizations in a future dominated I
dwindling resources. : process of spending less is complicated
by the culture prevalent in public organizations to spend all that ::
possible
Cutback management is the term which has been coined to
apply to the management of tradeoffs, re-allocations,
organizational contractions, program terminations, sacrifice, and
reduction of benefits previously felt to be irrevocable. Cutback
management is a means of managing organizational change toward
lower levels of resource consumption.
Four aspects of resource scarcity must be considered when
formulating strategies to implement cutback management:
• People are more willing to make organizational changes it
those affected have something to gain. When resources are-
scarce, organizational change will become more difficult since
there is little if anything available to reward those involved.
There are many constraints in public organizations. Each
constraint reduces the manager's options for managing the
decline for the good of the organization.
Organizational decline raises serious morale and job satisfacti
problems which make it exceedingly difficult to increase
productivity and compensate for the reduced inflow of
resources.
It is less fun to work in an organization plagued by resource
scarcity. Creativity and innovation inevitably decline, ip.zf
10:p. ISO]
Under cutback management, government is faced with the
necessity to terminate programs, reduce the level of activity in
others, and make tradeoffs between new demands and old
programs rather than, as in the oast, simplv exoand to meet the
new demand. New managerial techniques must be devisea to
ensure organizational integrity under decline when ail past
experiences have been based on Growth. Public emoiovee morale
and productivity must be boosted in the face of increasing
centralized control and shrinking opportunities for promotion. [P.ef.
9:p. 316]
A. INCREMENTAL CUTS VERSUS CUTS INTO THE BASE
When considering the necessity for cutting back, it is
important to differentiate between incremental cuts and
significant, or "quantum" cuts in an organization's budget.
Budgeting, traditionally has been incremental. Normally, the
increment is positive, adding to or expanding the previous
budgetary "base." With expansion, new programs are
23
implemented and old programs expand. The organization
flourishes, and conflict is reduced. [Ref. 11: p. 11] Both the
member? of the organization and those that depend on the
organization for goods or services are happy
The budgetary base represents the expectations of the
organization that current programs will continue to flourish in
future budgets [Ref 12: p. 17]. Once in the base, it is accepted
that the program will survive. The program, and its participants,
achieve a level of stability. They have reached equilibrium within
the organization.
If the incremental increase is less than that which was
proposed, the rate of expansion is reduced, but the organization
still prospers. Though tradeoffs must be made, there is always a
chance, and normally hope, that a program that did not make it
this year due to tight money, may make it next year. The base
is left intact. Nobody loses, though some may net win a: mush
as they would have liked.
We are so ingrained with organizational growth that it is a
major challenge just to get those involved to accept that a
significant decline in resources is not just a temporary detour on
the road to further expansion. It is nearly impossible to get pul
managers to confront the stark realities of cutback management.
There is a significant difference in facing the small and
incremental decline in resources and when facing a "quantum" cut
into the budgetary base. Cutting beyond the increment and into
~H
the base has become more and more necessary lately L. _ A. '.- _ A- A 1_ _ST
- J - -
_t - '. . A -.
local, state, and now, finally, with Gramm-Rudrnan, the federal
level. When cutting into the base there are clear winners and
losers. [Ref. 11 :p 11] The loser can't be soothed by giving him
something; there is nothing left to give.
If quantum cuts are experienced, the incremental budgeting
model will no longer adequately function m the new, resource
constrained environment. 'During incremental decreases the
manager must plan and organize with the goal of regaining the lost
:r cut resources. Under severe, quantum cuts, without
expectation for restoration, the role of the manager is dramatically
different. In this case, the manager must set about to
restructure his organization, to match his mission with the new
level of his resources. [Ref. 11: p. 21]
Mo longer can management "'muddle through" by deferring,
hiding cuts, or cutting across the board. Strategies which
revolved around defending the base until incremental cuts could I
restored are no longer germane. [Ref. 13: p. 327] The base has
been cut, it is no longer intact. Perturbations to the base make
the budgetary process exceedingly difficult since organizational
equilibrium has been upset. Managers are now operating in a
different environment than before the quantum cut.
25
5. IKE IMPACT OF QUANTUM CUTS ON ORGANIZATIONS
When faced with declining resources, a manager can either
eliminate an organization or cut it hack. Termination is often
easier, it only requires that the organization be destroyed.
Retrenchment, the process of turning a going organization into a
smaller one, which does less, with less, is a far greater challenge.
[Ret. 14. p. bx-j
Organizations cannot be cut back in the reverse order in - ~'~ :r
they were assembled The nature of organizations is such that as
a part, ire it program or service, is added, it rapidly merge* with
the parent organization, and a new level of organizational
equilibrium is achieved. This equilibrium is reinforced and
nurtured by the resultant formal and informal organizational
structures which arise in the expanded organization. [Ref. 9:p
01 /J
The efforts of the people who make up an organization, are
more, or at least different in quantity and quality, than the sum
of the efforts of the individuals working by themselves. Likewise,
the components of an organization, whether physical, social, or
personal are, when aggregated within the framework of the
organization, more productive than when taken and considered
individually. [Ref. 15: p. 79] It therefore follows, that when
components of an organization are eliminated, the effect on the
organization, and on its environment, are more severe than when
eliminating a lone program of equal scope. Cutting back any
component beyond the point where organizational slack can
compensate will yield a resultant output greater than the
magnitude of the cut. [Ref. 14: p. 615]
C DECISION MAKING DURING CUTBACK MANAGEMENT
As retrenchment proceeds organizations tend to loose flexibility
Cutback management necessitates centralized decision making. A
central authority must develop the alternatives and choose where
cuts will be made. Elements of an organization can hardly be
expected to voluntarily cut themselves to the degree required.
Before the alternatives are chosen, the leaders must create an
atmosphere where the decisions can be accepted. [Ref. 14: p. 61?
When organizations are expanding the penalty for a wrong
decision is frequently inconsequential. During periods of
abundance management seldom relies on formal, rational decision
making aids. Policy making can be characterized as based on
habit, intuition, and other informal means since the the cost of
making a mistake in allocation can be absorbed with additional,
plentiful resources. Planning can be less precise. A good decision
is good enough since under expansion there are seldom real losers.
When resources are scarce, planning becomes more
complicated. A good decision is no longer good enough. Now,
there will be real losers if resources are mis-allocated. Decisions
must be based solely on what is best for the organization. A
rational and formal approach is required to ensure all competing
alternatives for the dwindling resources receive adequate
consideration. In times of austerity, when the benefits of formal
decision support systems are most needed, the funding for their
development and use is frequently not available [Ref. 9 p 317]
The money to support the planning staff function is usually the
first to 20, since the planning staff can be cut without directly
affecting current operations [Ref. 11: p. 12]
.
This myopic approach to planning is characterized as the
"management science paradox":
• analytical decision making aids are critical to success in an
environment of resource scarcity
• when faced with certain budget cuts, the most capable
planning staffers are lured away from the organization Y.y
more promising opportunities
• a hiring freeze (normally in effect) prohibits further hiring
• the planning staff is then cut to avoid cutting those in direct
service/client support
in essence, when the optimum analytic capability is available
to an organization, when resources are abundant, precise
planning is not required. During periods of resource scarcity when
every decision is critical to the organization's survival, the
capability is no long present due to attrition, cuts, and shifting
organizational priorities. [Fief. 10: p. 180]
o,q
--.
D FHE MANNER IN WHICH ORGANIZATIONS FACE CUTBACK
MANAGEMENT
In a public organization, each element of the organization
exhibits a mix :C motives, some to enhance the local area, some
the national, some to enhance the clement, and some aimed at
furthering the organization as a whole. Under conditions of
growth, requests for resources usually can be framed and
evaluated with the goals of the organization in mind. When
required to make cuts, however, organizational elements normally
volunteer cuts which will best provide for the sub-unit's survival,
without considering the impact of the proposed cut on the whole
organization
. [Ref . 8:p. 319] The survival instinct leads to near
term sub-optimization of maintaining the integrity of the element
for as long as possible.
The survival instinct leads most people to deny that cutbacks
are really necessary. Even an initial decline in resources will not
convince all of the organization that the decline is permanent. To
avoid reality, the initial discrepancy between plans and resources
can usually be met. Near term solutions to shortfalls such as
creative accounting, across the board cuts, or deferred
maintenance can usually postpone the fundamental decisions on
cutting back. A belief that the problem is only temporary leads
everyone to share the pain until relief. The deferred maintenance
will have no short term impact and equipment and facilities will
suffer no long term deterioration since the cuts will soon be
restored. [Ref. 14: p. 615] The preeminence of survival explains
29
the contrast between the lofty goals often enunciated by managers
when approaching cuts and the reality of minimizing the cutback
rr-
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t i n 1 Cutback management, when the base has been cut, does
not allow for this luxury.
Unfortunately, when the reality of the long term nature of
the cuts is realized, it becomes evident that short term measure*
which may have been unwisely implemented may have dire Ions
term consequences. Short term solutions, aimed at avoiding the
crisis, are inappropriate and self defeating To defer maintenance
will only worsen the plight of the organization in a few years
when the cuts over the years have taken their toll. To succeed
in managing retrenchment, the public manager must forego the
short run expediencies.
The cumulative effect of repeated across the board cuts and
deferred maintenance, typical short term solutions, will result in
the total deterioration of the organization's physical plant and
programmatic vitality. The manager ceases to effectively manag?
and the organization ceases to function.
Management must get the organization through the denial
mode as fast as possible. Until the organization accepts reality,
cutback management cannot be effective. [Ref. 14: p. 615]
JU
E. THE ROLE DF LEADERSHIP IN CUTBACK MANAGEMENT
Leadership is the quintessential characteristic necessary for
successful cutback management. Leadership requires establishing
the inevitability of decline, pointing out the opportunity cost of n
cutting back, and creating new strategies to match resources wur
newly revised or conceived programs [Ref 14' p. 619]
The first requirement of organization leadership during cutback
management is explaining to the organization, in an unequivocal
way, that resources are declining and that major cuts are
imminent. This does not mean a single statement, but a
continuing series of reports, briefings, and speeches. Convincing
the organization of the reality of cutting back is an intellectual
exercise, but gaming acceptance of retrenchment is a pyschological
chore. Managers cannot just present the facts, the members of
the organization will not believe them. A manager must "flood hi=
people with facts" until the members of the organization cannot
escape the reality of impending cuts. [Ref. 14: pp. 615-616]
This is not easy. In the initial stages of retrenchment, few
people are willing to believe the lack of resources is real. Initial
attitudes are optimistic—the decline is temporary, real cuts can be
avoided, or cuts will be restored. Management credibility suffers
as the organization comes to believe it can weather this budgetary
storm and avoid the forecast cuts. [Ref. 10: p. 181]
Managers must come to grips with scarce resources and
convince members of the organization that cuts are really going to
come. They can appoint a committee to study the issue, but in
the end the manager must prioritize and finally, cut. Leadership
bated on maintaining coalitions, the norm under incremental
increases, soon breaks down under resource scarcity ' nagernent
must search for a more effective strategy. Management must
become more active and intrusive. [Ref. 14: p. 618] Dynamic
ieader; who can accumulate resources and brine power tc* i-
bear, in an otherwise fragmented organization, are required during
cutback management [Ref. 13: p. 328] . Leadership must be
willing to accept criticism from those cut and able to gem the
respect of these not. Being able to take the heat is a necessary
part of cutback management.
The public manager must educate both his organization end his
superiors regarding the new levels of resources and programs, the
new equilibrium, of the organization. Mew strategies cannot ee
dictated from the top. The organization's new strategy mute
evolve from the growing realization that resources are declining
The new strategy must emerge from an iterative process of
discussion and acquiescence. [Ref. 14: p. 61 9 J
In addition to selecting the strategies for coping with a decline-
in resources, management must also decide on who will be let go,
and what programs will be reduced or eliminated. Deciding on
where to make these cuts is a test of management intelligence and
courage. Each choice carries significant opportunity costs that
cannot be erased in the future by eventually restoring the
-v* ----..
L *ief . 9:p 319j When considering when and where to
make cuts, the cost of the cuts, and the opportunity cost of not
making them must be considered. It is important, and in fact
essential to ask, "To what purpose will the resources saved by
manner Hl£ -•U hp n^pr3 ^" T p=He"^hin H^n->=-nH^ tb^t the?
opportunity cost of not making the cuts be articulated. The
lll&kliXWzi must explain now trie organization win put the tur11 mit lb?
saved to use, and how the organization will benefit from the cut
F ALLOCATING HIJTS
The allocation of cuts usually involves a tradeoff of the
distribution of cuts across the organization (equity) and the
maximizing long term total benefits to the organization as a whole
(efficiency)
.
Cuts based on equity are easier, more justifiable, cheaper in
the very short term, and involve fewer decisions. Across the
board cuts are expedient but insensitive to the needs of the
organization or sensitive to the varying contributions of various
organizational elements [Ref. 9: p. 322], When cuts are taken
across the board, efficient elements will likely be penalized more
than poorly run ones. Decisions will be tougher in the more
efficient organization since there is less resource slack due to the
element's inherent higher efficiency. [Ref. 10: p. 181]
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Efficiency cut5 assess the contribution of each element toward
the goals of the organization in determining where the cuts in
resources will occur. The more an element contributes, or the
more efficient an element is perceived, the less it will be cut.
Efficiency cuts, while more time consuming and much more
painful to the 'organization to administer, better focus attention
on the goals and responsibilities of the organization. [Ref. 9: p.
T Q "
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Since people are the essential elements of ail organizations, an
personnel cos's make up a significant portion of the budget, tl
treatment of personnel during cutback management is of particula
concern."
If an organization is threatened, so too are its members. Tl.:
decline in resources, that is, cutting into the base, destroys the
assumptions upon which each member based his own personal
worth. If his program is cut because it does not measure up to
the new standard, then the member may also feel deficient. [Ref
1*1
. p. Dl / J
Austerity measures tend to increase workloads and at the
same time create uncertainty over job security. Simultaneously,
rewards for good performance are reduced or eliminated. [Ref.
16: p. 177] With increased workloads and decreased rewards,
morale rapidly erodes.
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When resources are scarce there are fewer promotions to
motivate and retain good managers. An organization which n not
expanding, but is in fact, contracting, will not attract talented
younger workers. Even if they are hired, there is nowhere for
them to go. Without the inflow of new employees, the "skill pool"
of the organization stagnates [Ref. 9: p. 317], This stagnating
effect occurs just when the organization needs the best people
available to face the fiscal crisis.
Hiring freezes are the first measure traditionally employed to
cope with a reduction in resources. Hiring freezes are at best a
short term strategy to buy time and assess options while the
extent of the cuts is analyzed. In the long run, hiring freezes are
neither efficient nor equitable. Hiring freezes take away some of
management's options, most likely harm minorities who are just
entering the workplace, and do not differentiate between varying
rates of attrition. When resources dry up, the most skilled will
move on at greater frequency than than least skilled if the rnosi
skilled leave the organization during cutback periods, their
replacements need to be hired the most urgently. [Ref. 9:p 'aa!
H. STRATEGIES FOR CUTBACK MANAGEMENT
The literature abounds with prescriptions on how to cope with
a fiscal crisis. Cutting back services and expenses, improving the
inflow of resources, and improving personnel management and
productivity are the methods frequently cited for coping with
J J
retrenchment. There are, however, severe challenges in
transforming these generalized steps into actual practice. Many
constraints and site specific factors are present .
A popular strategy when incremental cuts are implemented is
to cut the less visible items This normally involves cuts which
not appear to directly involve program activities. General
administration expenses such as the department office or staff
functions may be cut without appearing to affect any specific or
desirable program Natural targets include supply budgets,
tintenance items, and physical plant expenditures [Ref. 11 :p
31]. Maintenance activities are quick to suffer since it Dften
appears maintenance can be deferred for a short period without
impact. The result may be that deferred maintenance may turn
out to be much more expensive to correct in tha end [Ref. 11
103 j This strategy has a very distinct short term focus and .
inappropriate when managers are faced with long term cuts into
In-. U _i j -_
Longer term strategies deal with looking at the organization a?
a whole and making reductions which will enable the organization
to best carry out its mission, or best fit with the revised mis=
of the leaner organization.
One method examines productivity criteria. This is difficult,
but each element's marginal product per unit of input is
determined. By cutting back ail elements until the marginal
product of each element is equal, both equity and efficiency are
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achieved. While theoretically sound, the practical problem is that
to accomplish this, a strong and vibrant analysis and planning
staff is required, a luxury which most organizations faced with
:utting back quickly forego. In reality, this technique break:
down under the "non-rational" nature of decision making in most
organizations The final cuts end up resulting from a mix of
analysis and political bargaining. [Ref. 9: p. 3-22]
Organizations decide early if they are going to resist or smooth
the cuts. By smoothing the cuts, the organization's most
important functions or long term capacity may be preserved
Resistance is tantamount to stonewalling and usually serves as a
counterproductive, delaying device.
An additional strategy decides on whether to take a deep gouge
or small cut m organizational resources. Although the deep gouge-
is the best management strategy, since it enables the manager to
take his cut and then start rebuilding his organization, the political
realities make the thought of this unpalatable to most managers
Taking a series of smaller cuts is risky since, once the process
-'—:-*-< V, .-. 1-. -, ,.- ,
it may De hard to reverse
Across the boards cuts have few merits other than that they
are easy and relatively painless. Eventually however, when the
cuts are real and prolonged, the across the board cut is no longer
possible. If the situation gets bad enough, leadership must
emerge, set priorities, and start cutting the lowest priority
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program; Somewhere along the path of decline, top management
must sriiit to td* geted cuts.
The imposition of resource constraints can be viewed in a
positive light as a mechanism for change Many things which
were once not possible may now be attempted. While many
problems develop, cutback management does present the
opportunity to correct old wrongs. [Ref 16: p 1%B]
in cutback management, the uncertainty involved in m
a cut is a key variable The effects of specific ruts on the
organization as a whole cannot be accurately and consistently
forecast. As organizations shrink, the cost of doing less busine
may increase due to decreased economies of scale. [Ref 11 p.
The difficult part of cutback management is to select action: that
are equitable, politically feasible, effective, and still remain withi .
the economic means of the organization. To select the optimum
course of action when confronted by the necessity of cutting into
the base, management must be guided by a strategy for the
I. STRATEGIC PLANNING DURING CUTBACK MANAGEMENT
Retrenching organizations must have a strategic plan. During
periods of growth the absence of any clearly understood strategic
plan for the organization's development might not be too serious
Resources are growing and every cause or program can be
provided some support. During retrenchment, when serious cuts
TO
are required, it is essential to have a comprehensive statemeni
purposes, plans, and objectives— a strategic plan. Growth can be
managed on an ad hoc basis; retrenchment cannot. Ad hoc
decision making, responsive zq only crises and interest group
pressures, can be disastrous. [Ref. 14: p. 617] Without a goal, it
impossible to structure the decision making process, the planning
process will remain ad hoc.
A rev/ strategic plan may require the organization to seek a
new equilibrium size Under resource scarcity managers have to
rethink not only their requests for resources but also their
organization'* mission Strategic planning provides a rational
element to the difficult decision making environment experienc
during cutback management.
Questions to be asked include: What now are the principal
purposes of the agency, what programs should now be pursued,
and how can the resources that it now has best be mobilized 9
Managers must select both purposes and plans in deciding whai
the organization should do and how to do it. If management has
a clear strategy, it has created a basis for allocating resources,
evaluating performance, resolving conflicts, justifying decisions,
and performing a wide variety of tasks. [Ref. 14: p. 613]
Without strategic planning, government managers, shocked by
impending program cuts, may adopt several pathological decision
patterns: no planning at all, rigid resistance, intensified despair
and a willingness to dismiss all programs. If all else fails the
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planning may provide a useful psychological crutch. [Ref. 11: pp.
52-56]
A viable strategic plan is instrumental in controlling the
ramifications of retrenchment. If retrenchment cannot be
controlled, the organization is caught in a vicious cycle:
first round of programmatic cuts•
*
j
most talented personnel get discouraged and leave the
organization
productivity is reduced
additional funds become hard to obtain with less productivity
• a second round of cuts follow, and cycle repeats
The key to controlling retrenchment is to break this cycle by
quickly reaching a new level of organizational equilibrium.
Management must set up the goals for the smaller organization,
then plan on how to get to that size. The new plan, and strategy
to achieve it, must match the revised role of the organization with
the expected level of resources. The smaller size of the resultant
organization doesn't necessarily mean the prime mission is
accomplished any less well. It may just mean that only the
prime mission is now undertaken. [Ref. 14: p. 617]
Cutting back on a program necessitates cutting back on the
organization's purpose. Cutting back requires sacrifice. Only a
sense of purpose makes sacrifice worthwhile. If the purpose of an
organization is being curtailed, it is all the harder for its members
to sacrifice. [Ref. 14: p. 618] An explicit strategy can provide a
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sense that the organization has at least some control over its
destiny, and hence, raise the morale of the organization by clearly
defining its new purpose. [Ref. 11: p. 80]
While there is no shortage of theories or guidelines for cutting
back, successful cutback management inevitably proves more
difficult to implement than to read or write about. Managers in
California found this to be the case when trying to cope with the
limited resources following the passage of Proposition 13. There
are, however, valuable lessons to be learned about the difficulties
of really cutting back by studying the California experience.
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THE IMPACT OF PROPOSITION 13
ProDositior formerly referred to 33 thf iJarvis—Gann
It'r- - 7- - r-+* r lav T >~> 1 fl = *":*. ra \«,-r,c t-- =. r c -? .--^ ~ -. -- >"---.-'-.-.-,-•>-—'• < --• - - - ,- - - —








'.yj O'-'C Cl *""n^ C; *.'/ —>-,-- : • ' • - r\
established stringent recruirements for any future tax increases
f~- of 1 "7 - r> '
"'
Though the implications of the initiative were far reaching,
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Even with the bailout money from the state, local governments
across the state faced a revenue shortfall of ever $2 h:.'.:cn dollar
The manner in which local managers coped with this quantum
shortfall, a shortfall which cut into their budgetary base, provide
an opportunity to observe the actions of public managers in an
environment characterized by scarce resources.
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.:.-- puDiic oaciceo Proposition 13 for its snor
; ruction in public services Since lower taxes were easier tc
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The aid from the state, the so-called "bailout" money, was noi
disbursed without "strings". For instance, to receive aid. local
governments could cut neither police nor fire service below "Pre-
Proposition 13" funding levels [Ref 18:p 184] Counties whi
received state money had to ensure that health services did n :
receive more than their share of the cuts. Pay freezes wers ilsc
ured and if pay was not frozen, very strict provisions :
merit increases were constituted IRef 19: p. 532]
Clearly, relations between governmental units were affectec
Proposition 13. Relationships migrated toward much greater
centralization with a resultant decrease in local control The
result was that managers at the local level had much less powe
to effect their own fiscal policy iRef 19: p. cool
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The dominant response of California governments to Frew:
13 was attempting to maintain organizational continuity, ti
status quo. Many localities in California initially attempted to
with reduced revenues. Programs were cut without review o:
their merits, but in strict accordance with the principal that oil
units of local government would be cut across the board by the
same percentage.
AA
ihe across the board approach could not be sustained. Thoi
ah' departments/programs would willingly go along with incremental
increases to their budgets, the same could not be said tor
incremental reductions. Agencies with political clout and influence
would not settle for the same proportion cut as another agency
r.m: powerr - y * r> 1 ip ihe end result was that the eueiei
-;QC
migrating up the chain of command tu levcis oest suited to balance
and prioritize competing claims for resources kf>T /;. . P n . .j 77Q_/! n
Th€ perceptions of decision makers played key roles in shaping
: 'ganizational responses to Proposition 13. Many managers
responded by attempting to "routinize" the impact of cuts
necessitated by Preposition 13 by viewing the cuts as just another
fic/--=i -»-r=vr fp.of it'« 17R] Rv fsilincf to sHnnt ^mar*"'*?
measures, managers postponed the inevitable and further
complicated an already complex management problem.
The response to Proposition 13 in Oakland, while conforming to
the statewide of norm of maintaining the status quo, took a
different, seemingly more proactive approach. There was little n
any effort made to downplay the problem of the impending cuts,
and most strategies employed were straightforward. There was
never a stage of across the board cuts, with cuts in Oakland
targeted very early in the cutback period. [Ref. 21:p. 623] The
general approach was to delay capital expenditure and shift those
fund: + o maintenance, to use federal funds where possible to make
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up for lost revenues, to eliminate programs within departments,
and finally, as a last resort, to cut personnel.
While conforming to the theoretical approach to cutback
management, Oakland's :uts were not, in all cases, as sound th<
might seem. 7ov example, the priority of cuts was formalized
mly after they included the city council's political preferences.
Similarly, in pursuing the cuts, rational analysis did not
always provide the 'ions for determining the programs to be
effected Most cuts were implemented subtly so that recipients
-
rere unaware : the scope of the :\ . 21: p 625J Ir
essence, programs were cut so that public opposition was
In the end, political considerations dominated the adjustmei !
to life after Proposition 13 Manager: had to balance the public"*
call for cutting back with local organizations' concerns for
maintaining social programs. Proposit n 13 modified the cult'
of policy making Austerity and reliance became the new
buzzwords with trade-offs and constraint more important than
progress and reform [Ref. 20: p. 25]. Local programs were kept
afloat, spending was reduced, budgetary pain was doled out
unevenly as programs, and cuts, were prioritized. High visibili
services suffered less than those with specialized clientele. [Ref
20 pp 58-o9|
As was evident from the California experience it is much more
difficult to implement strategies for cutback management than it n
<4U
io list possible methods with which to cope, ["he exact approach )i
a spec::;- organization involved considerable tradeoffs among choi
govemea oy constraint?, capabilities, and the overriding strategy
C. PLANNING FOR FHE CUiS
A fundamental ingredient of cutback management is effective
long range planning. The City of Oakland's planning efforts wei
'. 'V i 1 IV
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a financial analysis of the impact of Proposition 13. fhe initic
report projected a revenue loss in excess of $35 million dollars
After reviewing the report, the city manager prepared an
alternate budget, whereby the lost revenues would not be
replaced In formulating the budget, policy
developed to give the city council an appreciation
ctilti natives Wei f
of the impact
a $35 million cut. While the initial plans were based on a \a
case scenario, a scenario which never came about, tn<t i_ i >.
and the citizens of Oakland began looking beyond the short term
panacea of reduced taxes. [Ref. 18: p. 36J The advanced
]_' i '-t i i 1 i i I 1 ^-, .
• served to alert officials and managers to the legal, fiscai.
and operations! impacts or Proposition I1 3
• served to get an alternate budget generated on which to
"quantify" the impact of Proposition 13
educated Oakland's citizens to the impacts and permitted a
better informed choice between less tax and fewer
services [Kef. 18: p. 45]
Long range planning commencing as soon as Proposition 13
qualified for the ballot, and an aggressive communications plan
enaoieo Uakiano to better cod'-3 and its citizens ^o oarticiDate i 1" the
process of cutting back. Oakland's response contra; red sharply
with most local governments which waned until election day before
examining the impact of the initiative. This wait and see attitude
left little time to plan, refine, and implement strategies Lac ::r.
.
informat ion to the contrary most Californians believed the initiative
would only "reduce the i?r.' in local government when they voted
so overwhelmingly for Proposition 13. [Ref. 18. o. 184]
D. PROBLEMS IN DEVnLGPING dTRATE'oIES
in arrivmc at specific strategies to maintain the organization's
status quo while consuming less resources, some common problem
areas emerged.
First, many organizations failed to take adequate action h
confront the new, resource constrained environment. For
organizations which routinely faced marginal resource shortfalls,
the ramifications of Proposition 13 were regarded as "just another
crisis." Since the organization had endured countless other budget
crunches, the managers took a "business as usual" approach to r he
crisis spawned by Proposition 13. Therefore, managers had a very
difficult time in facing up to the magnitude of Proposition 13 cuts,
-
-.
L h - 6---'
J. %_. i— v-.-
r'lany organizations made minimal cuts in the popular or
.-""" programs. In many areas major cuts were made, but
tended tc fall on programs which did not receive public
;
-- n
1* also became difficult, at the organizational level, to establish
between essential and non-essential services. Programs which s.t
cue viut had been nice—to-have extras had succeeded in buildin
up a ronstituency sue had become intermeshed with the
organization or "he whole. In attempting to "cut the fat", the fat
aiwa •',.--. =n __ p I £ J P'i '-••*, I Cli.ll
Wuh the pay and hiring freezes, personnel cuts, and
program reductions , many organizations were placed in a position
of being able to marginally meet current responsibilities bui un '
to meet future commitments. In particular, long range plan? m I
planning frequently became victims o: the cuts. For instance, the
. .
. a . * i - --. 2 mty Flood Control District's capital constr ! 1 f" i 1 *"\*
was rendered obsolete due to financing limitations brought on by
Preposition 13 [Ref. 16: p. 176]. The impact of this sacrifice of
long; term planning for short term survival is still not clear.
e. :::: imunicating when resources were scarce
Fettering communications during cutback management is
essential for the leadership of the organization. Again, Oakland'
as a model. Even before Proposition 13 was
approved at the polls, the city prepared a short publication "Public
Service Impact Statement", describing in detail the Public Service
reductions which would result from the anticipated $35 million
The document was distributed by the city council,
lews media, and interested community groups. Notices were
also posted on public facilities, indicating the impact en that
facility if the cute were necessary. Numerous public hearings
were held. [Ref 18: p 5] These actions enabled Oaklan




tax reduction". Fhe public was then able to eauate the 1r fe iOS5 01 a
specific service with the benefits of the tax cut if the Proposition
was approved. Due in part to the communications by the city .:
Oakland, Oakland was one of the few California cities which
against Proposition 13.
:iu i:v: i-T.. JKl . iZ.i
Once it became apparent that across the board cuts and a
business as usual attitude would not suffice in the wake of
Proposition 13, managers throughout California began the difficult
process of prioritizing their programs and deciding on where and
how much to cui
In Oakland, all department mangers were initially given a
target figure (35% of their discretionary budget) to cut. In
reaching this level of cuts, managers were given the authority to
DU
ranK programs to be reduced or eliminated to meet the 35%
departmental reduction. This guidance, was of course, caveated
to ensure compliance with constraints imposed by the state, a
constraints which accompanied most federally funded programs
L
r;e. id. pp. *tu—3iJ me ranxed programs were then suomnted tc
the city where they were ranked with programs from all
departments. Unlike many cities, the list was actually used as a
basis for the cuts. [Ref
In the City of Los Angeles, 70^ of the spending was in "t<
Zip. 623J
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the remaining 30% of the programs were ipr
ror example, libraries ana paries open?
tori tn mnn
ir i<?r v//ith meat reducing hours from eight to five hours per day
Maintenance of streets was scaled back, with repaving standard:
going from once every 40 years to once every 120 years 1 ! ! The
capital improvement budget was also dramatically reduced. Only
s^Q million 1a/^c si r^i'^H^" ir~~ fi 1 >~ r^i v_iP" ^ ^ n >->-> - ' > \ /-, *-, ;»-> i .—;.-•>-, t • t- ,-< >-. .- - - \-~Lp .' 1 1 liliiUi. 1 WQj a v ulluUlt lL'i 1 Lti 1L1I1 i£, i j.< •_<»_ '•_' :.....!vli i:± lut;:'.i;:^'-i i;ttu3
Ref. 20:p. 116].
Cutting programs became very difficult because so many
sources of potential cuts were "protected". In the end, public
safety was favored at the expense of public works, health, welfare
and social programs.
c
b. iiKAl HuiCi rUK IVii\iMA'jii\tj I nil LulDn.UK.
Once the necessity for cutting back was acknowledged, several
general strategies appeared most attractive in matching "he
reduced revenues with organizational expenditures.
Perhaps the most popular was in replacing the lost tax iollars
with revenues from new fees or charges for services Since this
option has little applicability to the thesis, it will not be discussed
C. ,.i
A second approach was to pay later, in ether words, to 'l-'^-y
This involved not cr.lv stretching out the payment c £ bills, but ah
deferring projects, and maintenance as well. Capital ?xpendi
were particularly vulnerable to this with a philosophy of 'what
i r .-, + ,-.y- e ,- r.
-
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day.
Since pe ' ; the heart of any organization, and
rount for such a high percentage of its expenses, protecting th
payroll was central to all strategies. Hiring and wage freezes were
readily implemented to save jobs Reliance upon attrition,
accelerated, avoided layoffs in most cases Even by concentratin
on protecting the payroll, government administrators could not
prevent the eroding moral and quality of public servants. More
importantly, they could not make make government more
attractive for new talent. [Ref. 20: pp. 41-42]
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Programs receiving the greatest percentage of cuts were
libraries, parks, cultural activities, summer school arc adult
education bounties, on the whole, cut library spending i2:^ and
lultural/recreation expenditures by 18%. Cities cut both cat
-- programs about 8%. [Ret. 17: p. 19] In Oakland, 2 bookmobiles
eliminated and libraries reduced their hours 20% duringv V '_ ; "U
-
- 1 -
nths Library cuts mostly reflected reduced ser '
placed on the number of books one could request :
"
•
----- -' anciies, aHu increased the time for docks coming m on
inter-library loans. [Ref. 17:p 19] Museums cut back their hours
by 13% and the number of county park rangers acres: the state
was reduced by 50%.
Even with severe cuts to the recreation programs, few parks
were closed in either counties or cities. Instead, there were ft
supervised activities conducted by recreation department stalls
Selected activities were terminated and park maintenance sui
In Los Angeles county, park grounds and facilities maintenance wa
decreased, and cleaning was discontinued on weekends
Deferring maintenance became the norm under Proposition 13
Cic r\t— n- ,-ii :-»-• iitHoH riff 1 C ' =1 ' ..---. i-,- v-.- ,-\- tor! ivi * ^P '-,
Five wars of Dublic works cost cutting have left California with
a shabby legacy of pitted streets, chronically flooded
intersections, dingy public buildings, postponed road repairs,
phased out landscaping, eliminated street sweeping, dimmed
street lights, and the thinned cut work crews. [Ref. 20. pp.
168-169]
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complete a variety of maintenance tasks, the emphasis in
maintenance shifted to making superficial repairs (patch and
sealing) instead of resurfacing. In by I960, two norther::
California counties had permitted over 50 miles of paved road
revert to gravel since they did not have the money to repa1 :
them
In addition to less money being spent for road repairs, c tr
maintenance programs also suffered. In Los Angeles commercial
area street sweeping was eliminated, and machine sweeping in
residential areas was dramatically reduced. The elimination of
weed abatement programs created additional fire hazards. In 1.982
San Jose workers were required to place buckets under leaks in
City Hall since there was no money available to fix the leaky re :
Oakland's public works budget has shrunk 46% in real dollars since
I c78 [Ref. 2C.p 168-169]
Hs.rd hit too were capital improvements. Counties, in
particular, found that funding of capital need? such as roads,
bridges, hospitals, etc. became much more difficult. In many
counties spending on capital improvements was deferred, with
funds which had been budgeted for capital improvements divert -1
to fund current services programs. [Ref. 22: p. 17] In Los
Angeles, 20% of the capital improvement funds for streets were
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diverted to maintenance programs between 1978-1983 [Ref. 20: p.
173].
Politics were usually more important in determining the size of
cuts to police and fire departments. Although in many cases the
police and fire stations were more heavily manned than other
departments, clientele pressure, strong union organization, and
stringent conditions in the state's bailout programs protected most
police and fire departments from experiencing meaningful cuts.
When departments were cut, law enforcement duties were assigned
to officers from the services divisions. In some cases,
administrative duties were contracted out. In other cost cutting
measures, officers were given additional responsibilities to make up
for manning shortfalls. Treatment of fire departments proved
similar.
The most immediate service reduction following Proposition 13
occurred in education. Many schools in southern California
immediately cancelled summer school, and cut the salaries of
clerical staff during the summer months. In general, schools
tended to eliminate the peripheral programs. In addition to
summer school, adult classes were also cut while most schools
were able to maintain the quality of their normal classes.
General and administrative expenses also proved tempting to
budget cutters. At first, communities deferred expenses, reduced
secretarial staffs, drew on surplus funds, and left jobs vacant
longer than usual. Other communities tried unconventional
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method: to save money such as combining low enforcement,
sharing city attorneys, and combining transport systems. [Ref
20: p. 114] Fire alarm boxes were removed, street lights were
dimmed, security guards cut back, many city switchboards were
cut, and telephone information assistance reduced
The mo-' extensive cuts occurred in programs and personnel
which were not providing direct public services. In Los Angel..:
Zounty personnel training service? for other departments were
eliminated, and the county comptroller reduced accounting
assistance provided to other agencies Los Angeles County >nly
replaced emergency vehicles instead of replacing all county vein,
as originally planned and budgeted for. In Los Angeles, where
administrative expenses were cut 27%, the planning and data
processing deportments absorbed large percentages of the cu x [R
17:p. 23]
Localities looked for additional means to save on general
expenses, One solution was to contract out for services. Both the
Cry and the County of Los Angeles, amended their charters in
1978 to permit work to be contracted if the work could be
performed by contractors in an economic manner. A report from
the city administrative officer revealed that up to 7000 jobs could







[mpact on local government employees
trations, tensions, and difficulties all characterize the
local government personnel in the wake of
been noted, a principal strategy in co;:
with Proposition 13 was to protect the payroll to the maximum
extent possible. Attrition and hiring freezes evolved as the
principal means do this. Still, however, in cutting back, some
jobs were lost
-
"• K* ">V ^# >"V"; T~* i €? ' nht f\KPIh '-f S^O >~r 0*1 r£> y >-> >-vt r>n t rr v .*; r K r r\i, r *~\ '?Z r v .- vv-
- %/J cA-Cii i iyl'L. , '-'GliiiUI 1 iiG -?LClut tUvtl l4.Xiit.iiL- £1 -c vV jJy -_•'«_. n UXi;
1978-84 Local government, hardest hit by Proposition 13,
reduced personnel by 4.5% during the same timeframe. [Ret
lp.1 ':-,. \^
-znrr^ "* the*" r"t= r^ciil+^H from P*-^nnci*iry-> ' '"
oihers came from the elimination of positions due to the
termination of federal programs or grants.
Employees were quick to feel the brunt of the decreased
resources. Many agencies imposed pay and hiring freezes. Fay
freezes were eventually relaxed as the true impact of Prop 13
began to emerge. In some organizations even mostly symbolic
benefits were eliminated. A statewide uproar resulted when a?
employee in Alameda county failed to receive a relatively
inexpensive 10 year service pin due to the austere climate. [Per
16:p. 177]
Even prior to the vote on Proposition 13, morale among
governmental employees was low. In Oakland, termination notices
were mailed to over 1300 employees based on the initial projections
c 7
of cuts by the city manager. While the notices were soon recalled;
morale plummeted due to uncertainty over job security.
In some cases, it was necessary to lay-off personnel In Los
Angeles the largest personnel cuts occurred to those involved in
recreation and culture activities, road maintenance, and social
services. Health, fire and police experienced the fewest cut- [Ref
r-, —* a C
In Oakland only 227 out of the original estimate of 1300
positions were cut, and all but 70 were vacant due to the early
implementation of the hiring freeze. Of the 70 employees actually
cut, one was management and the rest were semi-skilled laborers
[Ref. 18: pp. 130-131] To compensate for the lost positions, either
'Ah r employees picked up additional responsibility or the job was
not done.
A common practice was to expand the job scope of many
highly paid supervisors. For example, the Los Angeles County
Chief Administrative Officer was for a while forced to wear three
hats: chief administrative officer, personnel director, and the heac
of animal control. [Ref. 20: p. 115]
Following the freeze on salaries of local employees, a condition
imposed in return for state bailout money, employee attrition sky-
rocketed. In Santa Clara County the attrition rate was three-
times higher than expected. In San Diego County 9 of 30
department heads left in the first 3 months following the
enactment of Proposition 13. In San Francisco area hospitals, so
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man;/ left + o seek employment with the higher paying private
nospitals, that those remaining were left with 6c hour work weeks
[Ref. c~:p. sj.
Not only did the more highly skilled personnel leave, but it
also became more difficult to attract highly qualified rock- lemenJ
The resulting mix of personnel, fewer in total and Less skilled.
meant that services could no longer, in many cases, be performed
at the same level as before Proposition 13. The freeze on public
pay lead to lower employee productivity since the better workers
moved en to better paying jobs
Labor relations suffered significantly front the series of cuts,
freezes, and retractions brought on by Proposition 13. Immediate y
following the passage of Proposition 13 there was a -"cry raj
decline in employee morale. Shortly thereafter, the mood 01 nee
employees shifted toward antagonism This shift lead, ultimately,
to greaser union activism, increased militancy, and greater
Drganizational conflict. Those most affected by this new militant
attitude were the young county workers [Ref. 23 p. 16].
As the attitudes shifted toward militancy, pressures from
employee groups increased. Threats of work actions, and actu u
occurrences of such actions increased [Ref 25 :p. 204]
r rganizational conflict, as expected, increased following the passe
or proposition lo.
5 s"
J. DECISION MAKING IN "THE WAKE OF PROPOSITION 13
As with most Dther facets of government, decision makinc
became more difficult in the Proposition 13 era Decisions no
longer resulted in an clement of an organization gaining Mow,
for one organization to win, another would have to lose Worse
decisions were frequently biased toward the short term. Due T :
cuts and inflation in the late 1970's many managers in Los Angeles
County found a dramatic erosion in their decision making p - er
that left the county with little ability to "'respond to con ..
needs." [Ref 20:p. 115]
In Oakland, the city's planning department mem more time
reacting to current problems and less time on long range plannir
Decisions became based on less comprehensive studies with greater
time required to respond to emergent problems.
In San Diego County, the decision and planning processes were
streamlined, with less background and fewer studies available or
7 i t
'--
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Counties which were forced to depend on both state and
federal sources of funding found they were hard pressed to address
future needs in a systematic manner. With the additional
funding, county managers' decisions were often based on satisfying
constraints rather than on what was locally determined to be the
best solution [Ref. 22: p. 17].
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K. KEY ASPECTS OF CALIFORNIA'S RESPONSE
The response by California financial managers to quantum
budget shortfalls resulting from Proposition 13 in many cases fii
the "lassie approaches detailed in the literature. Initially, efforts
were made to make the cutting process equitable. Reductions ~. k
me form of deferrals, but as shortfalls continued, programs began
tc be eliminated Maintenance programs and organizations noi
directly serving the public were the -first to feel the cuts, once
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Finally, organizations found they were more dependent on
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become more centralized.
The way managers in California faced the challenge of
Proposition 13 provides a vivid example of the actual process of
cutting back. The responses of those involved can now, with
hindsight, clearly be studied. The reactions to Gramm-Rudman,
the manner in which financial managers are coping with the
cutbacks, and the ultimate outcome of the various strategies bet.
employed are not yet as clear.
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"o understand how DOD managers are facii>-. rt 1- ---,cne ..'.: _'..;....
<udman mandated cuts, attention v/iil now be directed to th€
"esults of the Gramm-Rudman questionnaire
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The order tc sequestrate Sil.7 billion dollars from the FY-£
11 i t * r i it . t ) i j" i ibucket originated m A asnimrtcn out was executed in cne tieic
Amidst t -" co^tus'on un^^r^ai^^"*'/ snH r-^'c.- 1 i-^-i i c>-r^ 'which ^reet'
the seauestration mandate, came a realization from activity
financial manager A^ei ic UUiliU LU JJe ti:^
If . .- n ISrn
hp:^ I-;-; ^ n .- t-^>-t.
latine necessary cuts, now tney Dianneci prioritized aiic
wr. how much to cut. The impact of the cuts on both
activity's mission and its oecple is also important. Equally
important, especially when attempting to analyze the long ran>
impact of Gramm—Rudman is the manner in which Gramm-
Rudman affected command relationships of the participants.
rt. iMil UvE.rC.rt.J_i- livi-rtUi
Gramm-Rudman clearly impacted on the way in which
activities and their managers do business. Figure 5.1 provides,
percentage, the responses to a question asking managers to des<
bo
impact on nis or ner activity
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ne impact of Gramm- K.UG3
.lie majority of those surveyed observed that the impact on
their activity was, to some degree, negative. Far and away the
most common response, probably reflecting i'm traditional militai
^ttitud T.r«ll =«rcan qo a e as v/eli as arivtmnc else v/a
got by this year, but that it could not sustain operati
reduced funding levels. This feeling was reinforced when nearly
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r 3i the managers replied that this '/ear they wer
provide services at previous levels, but that the previous level
.ip-port could not be maintained. One respondent stated:
j .", _ - w a -.."' sp^'Pre t
^"
: 5 t t
,
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: r : r. ::. i his does not mean that the Gramm-Rudman
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D. None of the above
E. Deleted, Reduced, and Deterred




rieure keauirements nave been to keep operating buugel
within revised levels
When questioned on whether, in general, requirements were
being deleted, reduced, or deferred to keep operating bud
Oj
thin revised guidelines, r v/o thirds of the managers indicai
they were using a combination of strategies with most services
being reduced or deferred ri^urs 5 2 provides a graphical
pr eser I .. >! the responses
When pressed to identify the principal strategy employed to
cope with r^duc^c budgets, r he most predominant strategy prov






































Figure 5.3 If more than one strategy was employed,
what was the "principal" strategy9
In addressing the role that deferrals played in FY-86 cutback
strategies, one comptroller summarized.
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Gramm-Rudman cuts only became survivable because the hiring
freeze reduced the payroll and we deferred maintenance of \"
property and minor construction.
As ?]z\\re 5.4 indicates, in reducing programs, managers
generally focused en short term cuts or on a combination of !


























A. Short term cutbacks
B. Long term cutbacks





Figure 5.4 Reductions at your activity have consisted of
Most cuts were directed at the program's or expense category's
margin. While these marginal cuts enabled the financial managers
to achieve the necessary budget reductions this year, there was




and beyon i would not prove as fruitful Air >ne th
of moss responding stated no marginal ruts could be made in FY-
; ~
"he remainder or the respondents indicated that some
marginal cuts could be make in FY-87, but marginal cuts :
not re employed to the extent or with the success of this •;
p —.T7-) ,-,»-.r,T.Tp %Tc;i Ar TUIT FTC" AT FT\T\/TDOMlV/rFMT
An element integral to an organization's success in carrying
cut cutback management is its overall perception of ; f : fisc -
environment This perception comprises attitudes and - -
on both the severity and the longevity of the situation which
necessitates cutting into the organization's budgetary base
Generally, there are three postures which an organization m
take in facing retrenchment.
An organization may treat the cuts as another in a series
"routine" fiscal crisis. A classic example of this at- ' le is provided
by one manager who stated:
It :s par* of the navy drill 10 take away ffefm you in the first
two quarters and give it ail back in the last two quarter*
Some different excuse is used every year. This year it h^zp^r.t
to be Gramm-Rudman. We spent a lot of man-hours
researching, meeting, staffing, arguing, etc., to come up with
$1,500,000 in cuts. We fired over 40 people, let buildings
deteriorate., and destroyed morale in April. By August, our
claimant had returned all of the dollars to us. flow we have
to rush to spend it by the end of the year. We will spend it on
things we need, but we won't spend it as wisely as if we had
known at the beginning of the year. Don't blame Gramm-
Rudman, its the "Navy v/ay! "
OO
A second approach is mat the cuts may be consi
fide short term crisis, but that over the longer term, th<
organization believes relief will be provided. Thi< was \
iculatec ' rhen ne mr:ra:.-~ % lamented:
Most personnel were unable to accept that Congress had re
the operating runes Officers and CPO's truly believed thai if
they needed more funds, they (the funds) were there. It took
a very long time to realize the impact of Gramm-Rudman ind
resistance was high Ivlany still believe it won't last no matt
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. hs posture taken determines the course of action arid
strategies employed in facing the cutbacks. It is quite possible, in
fact likely, that over time, an organization will find itself
confronting its environment from ail three perspectives. In the
end, however, to succeed in cutting back, an organization must
fate th: fiscal facts and dig in for the long haul. Management
must strive to reach the third stage, that of acknowledgement, as
scon as possible since only strategies designed to deal with this
situation will prove useful over the long term.
The majority of the managers responding still feel their
organization is attempting to survive in the short term with
expectations for long term financial relief. Over a third of the
respondents feel, however, their organization is now in the final
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stage of posturing, and that it is coming to grips with Gramm-
Rudman as a long term force affecting their budgets.
"he persisting belief that Gramm-Rudman represents a short
term threat, for many, is reinforced by the influx, during th
August timeframe, of additional funds which had previously been
with! i by higher authority. A financial manager showed hi
:ern for this situation when he responded
In FY-:: we have ended wish more dollars than in previous
years, not less. Initially v/e were cut in March, but now w
are richer than ever. In March we were broke, new we are
roiling in dollars I am very concerned about FY-87 thou*
because 1 do not think there will be a bail out iike this "
undoubtedly, it is aimcuit to build organizational creaiomr,
regarding fiscal constraint when so many in the organization
expect that under some guise, the funds will always show up in
the end. While no one would suggest that funding, if available, be
withheld just to maintain organizational credibility, it it apoarent
that turning loose the fiscal floodgates in a business as usual
approach has hurt and will further inhibit managers from believin;
and thus optimally managing constrained resources.
C. CHANGING ORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS
One aspect of cutting back is that decisions tend to become
centralized at a level where alternatives can best be judged from
art organizational perspective. The reality of this was illustrated
when one respondent pointed out that, marginal cuts were now
affecting mission operations and thus, budgetary decisions had been
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elevated to a higher level. With increased centralization, higher
authority gains more control, and with more control, one exr - :t«
an :rcr"nE< in the amount of guidance received. Though by no
means unanimous, the data bears this out. Nearly 60% of the
activities responding indicated 'hat the amount of fiscal guidance
for FY-86 received from higher authority had increased. When
illustrating how control had shifted to a higher level a manger
recounted
Each :ime we say we can't because of lack of funds, direction
from above is 'do it anyway, and drop something else which
a c ~' ~ '' ~' ~ eu ec"t tne
Another state a
.
More questions are coming in on costs. Overhead costs,
travel, and overtime are being more closely reviewed at
headquarters
The remaining respondents indicated no change m the amour t
of fiscal guidance they received, while no activities felt they were
receiving less guidance. Correspondingly, 48% of those surveyed
felt that financial control exercised by higher authority had
. . reased while the remainder felt the level of control had
remained constant.
In examining the amount of discretion an activity was
provided in implementing FY-86 budget cuts, the most prevalent
response, 45%, was that the activity was given budgetary
discretion within Activity Groups, a category representing a broad
spectrum of related activities. For instance, if the activity group
represented Base Operations Support, alternatives from a wide
range of activities such as administration, supply, and shore based
support could be considered when cuts were required. Les:
numbers of activities had varying degrees of less discretion,
ging from discretion within a sub-activity group, such as the
administration activity under Base Support Operations to discreti
at the expense element only Just under i Q% stated they had n
flexibility at all, with all of their activity's cuts being specified.
J r..r.. rruL'KiJ -., -.... I
As both the literature on cutback management su
the California experience proves, financial planning takes
increased and vital significance during periods of cutback
management. An awareness of this existed among the finan< .
managers surveyed. One stated'
Planning has taken on a much greater role in the budgetary
process. There is an increased awareness on the impact oi todc
decisions on the out-years. Opportunities to defray out-year
expenses are seized when able and new program growth is
carefully controlled.
The benefits of advance planning did not escape the managers
surveyed. While few v/ould dispute the up front cost of planning,
the results, when articulated effectively, can be dramatic, as one
respondent explains:
We have been successful in getting cuts restored Early on this
command briefed the impact of the cuts to higher authority
We outlined the impact of shortfalls on our mission. This
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strategy was good, but required a lot of additional time
Dianmng and preparing briefings for senior leadership
dman most activities surveyed nave ieft
Almost bU/6 stated mat while tne size. . ,v - .
oi t:is stairs have not been increased more line managers were
' •' involved with "he financial planning function than had
prior tc Grarnrn-Rudman
.
Others related that the comptroller's
sistants were much more in demand, now with more required of
them. Only a very small percentage of respondents indicated m :
------- c t a f t c :-•-,-' Kos - .- • -
t
hen considering the adequacy of the planning staffs, over 75/o
felt that the ability cf the financial planners was adequate. Many
:;::. however, acknowledge limitations in their ability to condu- t
formal program analysis, often necessary in the face of difficult
allocation decisions encountered when cutting back.
In addressing the execution cf the FY-37 budget most activities
in moated they were already planning for a lower budget than
Driginally anticipated. As Figure 5.5 indicates, the recognition of
the need for planning for a reduced FY-'":"7 budget at the activity
'el was in contrast to the limited amount of guidance on
potential FY-87 budget cuts received from higher authority
Looking farther ahead, past the FY-36 cuts, over 60% cf the
activities have considered the inevitable impact of deficit reduction
when preparing their FY-83 budget submissions. Less than 20%





































Figure 5.5 What degree of guidance/planning have been
received/conducted in view of the high potential
:or cuts in the rY-d/ operating budget.£ — —
reduced control numbers. Alarmingly, 37% have not yet planned
on reduced resources stemming from future deficit redu tion
measures.
A significant majority of those responding indicated that • ten
initially considering the manner in which to implement the FY-
cuts necessitated by Gramm-Rudman, the activity's mission an !
critical functions were reviewed. This review appears to ha '
been instrumental in almost 70% of the cases when determining
which areas to cut. Generally, all programs in the base were
considered, in aggregate, for cutbacks, with newly instituted
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programs receiving the same consideration as the more established
programs
Functional categories aggregate many lesser budgeting areas
and serve as a significant groupings for budgeting decisions.
Functional categories are represented by:
iViiDi-/iv>i\ vri.;r-.. . . . - . o
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UTILITY OPERATIONS
SUPPORT CATEGORIES (various)
Of the commands surveyed, 80% prioritized cuts among
categories with the remaining activities strictly observing across
the board cuts When prioritizing cuts, by category, Maintenance
of Real Property was, on the average, the lowest priority
tegory, e.g., the first to be cut. This was well illustrated I
{ who said
1 am afraid we will keep our airplanes flying but from air
stations that are failing down around our heads.
As could be expected, Mission Operations was normally assigned
the highest priority, the last category to be cut. Administration
and Support categories were the next lowest priority categories
with the remainder ranking about the same. Table 6 illustrates
the average priority assigned for cutting each functional area
/ J
\Kdul o
priorities of outs among functional areas
Functions! Ca teororv Average Prioritv







The survey also examined how funds within a functional
category were cu r These expense elements further break dc














maintenance of purchased equipment




Although there was variance in regard to the priority placed
on each element within a functional category, general trends were
evident. Travel, purchased services, and supplies were normally
cut fairly early within a category. Likewise, civilian personnel.
75
and utilities and rent were normally the last to be cut v/hen
d:::^::: 1 ^' .or. was possible.
Mc clear trend was identified with regard" to the motivation
sor.no reinstating programs after they had been cut, although
certain categories of activities were reinstated more often than
others, The most frequently reinstated category was Mission
Operations, followed, distantly, by Maintenance of Real Property
Administration, Supply categories, and Base Services, v/hen cut,
were the leas 1: frequently reinstated categories or activities.
When programs were reinstated the most common reason cit
that funding, which previously had been cut, had been
restored Neither the seventy of the reduction on operations n
pressure from clientele were overriding considerations when
reinstating previously reduced programs.
The clear majority of respondents agreed that under fiscal
austerity the decision making processes were both more difficult
and took mere time A common sentiment expressed was that
during times when funding was more plentiful, funding decisions
were much easier and management had more flexibility. Only a
small percentage of respondents felt that the decision making
process had not been affected by cutting back.
E. COMMUNICATIONS WHEN CUTTING BACK
Communications are essential to effective management and are
integral to an organization They are not superimposed on ^ne
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structure, but are pa; r o: the structure. In particular,
communications take en added significance during periods of
anizational change or adversity ' When examining the level,
quality, and nature of communications relative to Gramm-
Rudman mandated budget cuts, bom internal and exter il
communications ''/ere reviewed. In general, respondents w
positive about internal communications, but were critical, in





felt that- interaction and
li dson b tween th commanding officer and department
?spectively, had increased, ' ith ! .. ?ach instance terr .
increase significant respondents felt that communications
between the comptroller and th? commander or department h
had ct-.r^-^^^d. Mot only were tha line managers more volv
in the process, but they also demonstrated increased awaren :
the importance of planning and executing budget dollars m the
austere, Gramm-Rudman climate
The increased interaction was also determined to carry be id
th :: with line authority Over 90% felt, as a result of Gi ~
Rudman and its impact on the activity, the level of budget
awareness had increased in the work centers.
An inevitable result of increased centralization is an increase in
the " lume of financial reporting. Clearly two thirds of the
financial managers surveyed felt that subsequent to Gramm-
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Rudman, financial reporting requirements to higher authority h •
increased. Opinions were mixed, however, with regard to whet!
internal reporting on financial matters had increased or remair :
the same.
Most managers were satisfied with the amount of informal] n
on the FY-86 cuts they received from higher authority, The
cannot be said for the timeliness of the information Only 15%
considered the timeliness good, while almost 45% believe:: the
timeliness to be poor or inadequate.
~ HOW PEOPLE FARED
Though the ability of managers to make decisions, structure
priorities, and define organizational relationships are all essential
services which must be performed, an organization lives or dies by
its people Classic "people issues" relevant to cutting back are
hiring freezes, increased attrition, and sagging morale How
the responses to cutting back by the activities surveyed impact on
their employees 9
A hiring freeze, a proven means of cutting back, was
implemented by almost 90% of the respondents, as Figure 5.6
illustrates. In almost all of these cases, the freeze was adopted































Applied across t board
Applied to selected areas
No hiring freeze ha 5 been implemented
Other
Figure 5.6 If your activity v/as given latitude in implementing -
hiring freeze, was the freeze
Though the hiring freeze v/as effective in providing near tern,
savings, the dangers of the freeze, if allowed to persist, were
evident. One concerned manager stated.
Dollars can be found, but. you can't buy good, trained people if
they aren't there.
Empirical evidence suggests that one of the classic results wh ..
cutting back is that employee attrition will increase and that th
that leave the organization will be amongst the most able, sine
:
their ability and skill level provides them a higher degree of
mobility. Employee attrition following the FY-86 cuts increased in
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:
of the activities surveyed. Attrition remained unchang












A. Among the top performers
B. Average performers •
C. Among the lower performers
D. A mixture of performers
•!£
Figure 5.7 Since 01 March, the civilian personnel
which have left your activity have been
Surprisingly, as Figure 5.7 indicates, only 15% of the respondents
indicated that these personnel leaving the activity were among the
too performers. A very significant majority, 81%, agreed that
those leaving were composed of a mixture of performers.
Another people issue, employee morale, deviated from that
which was expected. As Figure 5.8 indicates, a mix of reactions
occurred, with only oc'T of the rveyed agreeing to any
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Figure 5.8 Morale at your activity has decreased
Though morale may not have fallen as much as expected, r ::-
increased pressures of fiscal constraint did take a toll. One
manager, when reminiscing about the days when resources were
more plentiful commented:
Personnel were able to work with much less stress. The
decisions were made with much less pressure and concern to
make every dollar count
.
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Ih€ [ )D organizations which responded to the sur\ y f« ! tm
Gramm-Rudrnan mandated budget cuts in FY-86 from a vark
• perspectives, with a variety of strategies, and with mixed
results. These organizations were not the first nor will they be
the last to face quantum resource shortfalls Ore thing is cert
! lanaging under austere conditions is a different game than when
resources are plentiful. A comptroller summarized mis whs '
:s .1
There used T c :e man;/ 'fly by mm: financial managers,
with Gramm-Rudman more comptrollers have - ; i their
hands dirty We can nc ngei sign our names like using
rubber stamp. We require frugality at every level, from the
—
' iv * - - • . - - v - - ? v~ - - s- ~ >- too ' ( j syin i v. ^-. 1 1 .-i l y-i ,-r- ovorviriC1 ! >"
1_- — 111 •* l 1< f* VI 1\ v- <- i 1 V Cl >. V >- 1 i '_ V . U U;iU lllk-lU'-liU^ C '.•<.! yjlli HI
between.
Managerial responses to both Propostion 13 and Gramm-
Rudman mandated budget cuts have now been examined. What
conclusions can be drawn? By applying the lessons learned fr
the California experience and the theories of cutback management
it is possible to speculate on the status and ultimate succs^s of
cutback management in the Gramm-Rudman environment
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VI. CONCLUSION •
The reaction to the Gramm-Rudman mandated FY-86 budget
cuts by the financial managers surveyed was similar in many
respects to that theorized in the literature and demonstrated in
California following cuts imposed by Proposition 13. The most
difficult hurdle to clear when cutting back is reaching the
realization that the requirement for the cuts is long term, and
that cuts into the budgetary base first, have to be made, and
second, will not be restored. Organizations must understand that
the reason for cutting back is not to save money during the year
in question, but to pare the organization down to a level which
can be supported with a reduced stream of resources.^
As has been seen in both California, and now, within DOD,
reaching this realization is difficult. Though some activities have
been successful in reaching the final stage of recognition, most
have not. The August "bail-out" referenced by many respondents
exacerbated the already difficult process of acceptance. As a
result, many managers and their activities still view the impact of
deficit reduction on their budgets as another crisis which will be
weathered with help coming from higher authority when things get
tight.-/
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A. A COMPARISON OF RESPONSES/
By comparing the responses of managers to Proposition 13 and
to Gramm-Rudman it may be possible to judge the ultimate
outcome of the Gramm-Rudman deficit reduction process. Key
areas which can be compared are the planning and decision
making processes, inter-organizational communications,
relationships with higher authority, and of course, how the people
involved dealt with each fiscal crisis. By looking at each element,
a broad understanding can be reached as to where, after a year of
Gramm-Rudman, the DOD activities stand, and which areas need
emphasis if the activities are going to weather the deficit reduction
storm . •
DOD managers appear to be more aggressive in their
commitment to financial planning than their counterparts in
California. As has been noted in California, many planning staffs
were quickly cut since they were not directly involved in providing
services to the public. The DOD managers surveyed indicated that
planning staffs had been cut in very few cases, and that while the
size of the staffs had seldom been increased, there was significant
interaction between the planners and the line managers. The
importance of planning cannot be understated, especially when
faced with the prospects of extended budget reductions. •
The necessity of frequent and substantive communications are
essential to effective cutback management. The city of Oakland,
in particular, excelled in communicating the impact and extent of
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Proposition 13 to its populace. Oakland's managers, by attending
to this key management function were able to frame expectations
with a realistic appraisal of the impact on local government and
services. In contrast, other California municipalities, by failing to
adequately inform their citizens of the scope of the cutbacks, left
their populations with the belief that Proposition 13 would only
"cut the fat."'
Unfortunately, communications to the DOD activities surveyed
regarding the FY-86 Gramm-Rudman cuts and guidance .
concerning FY-87/88 were not considered very effective. Most
managers were dissatisfied with both the level and the timeliness
of the information received. The California experience validated
the literature in that effective communications are essential not
only for cutback planning but for execution as well.^
Both California managers and those surveyed agreed that the
decision making process is more difficult during periods of fiscal
austerity. Managers from both groups commented on the stresses
involved in decision making and how much more important it is to
make the "right" decision when scarce resources are in great
demand.-/
The overwhelmingly popular strategy of deferring maintenance
surfaced in both California and amongst the activities and
managers surveyed. While managers complained of roads decaying
in California, DOD managers were concerned with aircraft hangers
falling while the planes were still flying. It must be noted,
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however, that deferring maintenance is clearly a temporary
solution for short term savings. If this strategy persists it will
yield dire results, both in decreased readiness and in expenses to
correct.
While cutting at the margin was initially popular in California,
most California managers quickly realized that marginal cutbacks
would only go so far in meeting reduced, follow-on budgets. While
marginal cuts clearly predominated as the strategy to meet the
FY-86 Gramm-Rudman cutbacks, there is a growing awareness
among the DOD managers that marginal cuts will not suffice in the
future. Although most indicated their approach to meeting the
expectantly lower FY-87 budget figures would still include cuts at
the margins, there is clearly a realization that the margin is
getting too thin in many areas to sustain additional cuts. As
deficit reduction continues through the end of the decade, hard
decisions will inevitably have toAmade regarding vertical cuts of
entire programs/categories to achieve the necessary savings. It
happened in California and it will happen in DOD. V
As could be expected, while strategies for cutting in California
and DOD were very similar, so too, were the areas which were
protected from the budgetary axe. Both mission operations'
categories and those organizations providing public services were
usually the last cutV
Great pains were also taken to insulate personnel to the utmost
extent possible in both situations. Though a certain number of
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personnel lost their jobs as a result of Proposition 13 and Gramm-
Rudman, hiring freezes were employed in both California and
among the activities surveyed to cut personnel cost while allowir z
those already on the job to remain at work. Similarly, managers
from both areas expressed their concern for the longer range
consequences of the freeze. »/
A classic consequence of cutting back, loss of autonomy, was
experienced at the local government level in California and by the
DOD activities surveyed. The movement toward centralization was
greater in California due to the formalized requirements which
accompanied the state's "bailout" funds. COD organizations were,
by no means, exempt. Mangers commented how decisions
affecting operations were now being bumped up to higher
authority, and a majority stated that both guidance received from
and reports to higher authority had increased since Gramm-
Rudman became law.'
B. THE BOTTOM LINE AND RECOMMENDATIONS
After facing Gramm-Rudman and deficit reduction for less
than a year, DOD activities have made a start toward effective
cutback management. The process remains evolutionary. The
literature insists the way to cut back is by accepting the long term
nature of the cuts, and formulating strategies based on quickly
getting the organization down to a supportable size. Meanwhile
human nature, being what it is, attempts as long as possible, to
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hold on to the old organization, to maintain the status quo. The
marginal cuts and the underlying belief that help is on the way
clearly indicate that the DOD activities surveyed are still holding, on
to the old, and have not yet fully committed to achieving a
leaner, more supportable organization. It will take time, and the
shock of the ever increasing differences between the budget
expected and the budget approved will eventually force the issue. •
The transition will occur. Management must be sensitive to
the inertia present and take steps to promote the rapid transition
to an organizational size and scope consistent with the budget
available for its support.^
Emphasis needs to be directed toward:^
• Enhancing communications to the activity level by paying
particular attention to ensuring timely, consistent, and
accurate information flows to the managers who have to
execute the cuts.v^
• Implementing vertical (program or specific activity) cuts.
After a point, which may already have been exceeded,
marginal cuts will no longer suffice. Activities must make
the difficult decisions and eliminate entire programs to
achieve a level of operations which will be supportable.-^
• Eliminating short term cutback strategies such as deferral of
maintenance and across the board hiring freezes. Both of
these strategies are counter-productive over the long run. If
allowed to persists, an organization will quickly find both its
physical plant and its labor force old and run down. And
finally; S
• Regaining organizational credibility regarding the necessity for
cutting back. Regardless of the outcome of the FY-
87 Appropriations Act, activity managers will expect another
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end of year bailout. Until management at the activity level
is convinced that the requirement for cutting back is real,
organizational inertia to cutback management will remain
insurmountably high. S
While this study of responses to Gramm-Rudman proved
fascinating, there is still much left to do. Although FY—86 seemed
a key year to study the effects of deficit reduction, the reponses in
FY-87, when marginal cuts may no longer be viable alternatives,
could provide even more insight into the process of cutting back.
A separate topic would be to observe the "learning curve" of
cutting back, how lessons learned have been applied from FY-86 to
FY-87. The process of allocating cuts within various budget
categories or among organizational levels would prove useful in
understanding the decision making and priority setting processes of
upper management. Finally, a study of the continuing impact of
cutting back on DOD employees is required. Theory states that the
most gifted workers will leave an organization which is cutting
back. Though in general the top performers stayed with their
activities in FY-86, their flight may have been delayed by the
belief that the FY-86 cuts were "business as usual." Will this
attitude persist as deficit reduction continues? */
In looking at cutback management and the responses to
Proposition 13 and Gramm-Rudman certain themes persist.
During the early stages of this study, it seemed likely that
parallels could be found between the specific strategies employed by
the California managers and those implemented by their DOD
counterparts. The results of the study were expected to focus on
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how this or that activity deferred maintenance, let the roads and
grounds deteriorate to save operating funds, or became more
dependent on the decisions of higher authority. All occurred and
were reported. However, in aggregating the responses to the
Gramm-Rudman Questionnaire, it became apparent that there was
more.
A strong underlying current of uncertainty exists regarding the
ultimate result and impact of Gramm-Rudman. The FY-86 cuts,
and the prospects of continued cuts are certainly acknowledged,
but the activities concerned have not yet grasped the impact of
continued cuts on their size and method of doing business. If the
momentum behind deficit reduction remains strong, cuts into the
budgetary base will demand a reduction in size and scope of
operations. The activities will have to change to meet their new
levels of resources. They cannot continue to conduct business as
usual, or even do marginally less than usual. The activities
concerned, their clientele, and most importantly, their seniors in
the chain of command have to realize this fact of fiscal life. Until
this realization occurs, the hard decisions necessary to optimize
operations at reduced funding levels will be delayed./
The challenge of deficit reduction under Gramm-Rudman is
real and will not retreat. Leadership, vision, communications,
and credibility are required to overcome the resistance to
organizational change and move toward a level of operations which







1. THE IMPACT OF THE FY-86 GRAMM-RUDMAN CUTS ON YOUR
ACTIVITY HAS BEEN:
A. SIGNIFICANTLY POSITIVE (A REAL BENEFIT)
B. POSITIVE (WE WERE ABLE TO "CUT THE FAT")
C. NO IMPACT (BUSINESS AS USUAL)
D. NEGATIVE (WE LOST SOME GOOD PROGRAMS)
E. SIGNIFICANTLY NEGATIVE (HELP!
!
)
F. WE GOT BY THIS YEAR, BUT WE CAN'T SUSTAIN AT
THIS LEVEL
2. AS A RESULT OF THE CUTS MANDATED BY GRAMM-RUDMAN,
THE ACTIVITY'S:
A. MANAGEMENT HAS IMPROVED AND OPERATIONS HAVE
BECOME MORE EFFICIENT
B. OPERATIONS HAVE BECOME LESS EFFECTIVE
C. OPERATIONS HAVE BEEN REDUCED, BUT THOSE
FUNCTIONS WHICH ARE STILL BEING CARRIED OUT ARE
BEING DONE BETTER
D. OPERATIONS ARE BEING MAINTAINED AT PREVIOUS
LEVELS, BUT CANNOT BE SUSTAINED
E. THERE HAS BEEN NO IMPACT ON EITHER MANAGEMENT
OR OPERATIONS
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3. HAVE REQUIREMENTS BEEN IN ORDER TO KEEP
OPERATING BUDGETS WITHIN REVISED LEVELS? (CHECK AS MANY
BOXES AS APPROPRIATE)
A. DELETED C. DEFERRED
B. REDUCED D. NONE OF THE ABOVE
4. IF MORE THAN ONE BOX WAS CHECKED IN THE PRECEEDIMG
QUESTION, WHICH ONE TECHNIQUE OF THOSE CHECKED REPRESENTS





F NO TECHNIQUE DOMINATED




6. IF PROGRAMS WERE REINSTATED, THEY WERE DONE SO DUE
TO:
A. CUTS NOT BEING REQUIRED TO MEET REVISED
OPERATING BUDGETS
B. OPERATIONAL IMPACT TOO SEVERE
C. PRESSURE FROM CLIENTELE
D. OTHER
7. HAVE REDUCTIONS AT YOUR ACTIVITY RESULTING FROM
GRAMM-RUDMAN CONSISTED OF:
A. SHORT TERM CUTBACKS
B. LONG TERM CUTBACKS
C. MIX OF BOTH LONG AND SHORT TERM CUTBACKS
D. NO CUTBACKS
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8. HAVE GRAMM-RUDMAN MANDATED CUTS FOCUSSED:
A. AT THE MARGIN OF ALL/MOST PROGRAMS
B. AT THE MARGIN OF SELECTED PROGRAMS
C. AT ELIMINATING ENTIRE PROGRAMS
9. WHAT DEGREE OF DISCRETION DID YOUR ACTIVTY HAVE IN
IMPLEMENTING FY-86 CUTS?
A. NO FLEXIBILITY, ALL CUTS WERE SPECIFIED
B. DISCRETION WITHIN ACTIVITY GROUPS
C. DISCRETION WITHIN SUB-ACTIVITY GROUPS
D. DISCRETION WITHIN FUNCTIONAL CATEGORIES
E. DISCRETION WITHIN EXPENSE ELEMENTS
10. IF YOUR ACTIVITY WAS GIVEN LATITUDE IN IMPLEMENTING
A HIRING FREEZE, WAS THE FREEZE:
A. APPLIED ACROSS THE BOARD
B. APPLIED TO SELECTED AREAS
C. NO HIRING FREEZE HAS BEEN IMPLEMENTED
D. OTHER
11. WHAT EFFECT HAVE THE GRAMM-RUDMAN FY-86 CUTS HAD
ON PERSONNEL ATTRITION?
A. INCREASED
B. STAYED THE SAME
C. DECREASED
12. SINCE 01 MARCH, HAVE THOSE CIVILIAN PERSONNEL WHICH
LEFT YOUR ACTIVITY BEEN?
A. AMONG THE TOP PERFORMERS
B. AVERAGE PERFORMERS
C. AMONG THE LOWER PERFORMERS
D. A MIXTURE OF PERFORMERS WITH NO DISCERNIBLE
PREDOMINANCE
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13. WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING PHRASES BEST CHARACTERIZES
YOUR ACTIVITY'S APPROACH TO THE FY-86 CUTS, AND THE
OVERALL DEFICIT REDUCTION MOVEMENT?
A. TREATING THE "CRISIS" AS ROUTINE
B. ATTEMPTING TO SURVIVE THE CURRENT SHORT TERM
"CRISIS" WHILE HOPING FOR RELIEF OVER THE LONG
TERM
C. COMING TO GRIPS WITH GRAMM-RUDMAN AS A
LASTING FACTOR INFLUENCING BUDGETING
14. DURING THE INITIAL DECISIONS ON WHERE TO IMPOSE CUTS,




15. IF A REVIEW WAS CONDUCTED WERE THE RESULTS OF THE
REVIEW USED IN DERTERMINING WHICH AREAS TO CUT?
A. YES
B. IN MOST CASES
C. IN SOME CASES
D. NO
QUESTIONS 16-23 PERTAIN TO FY-86 GRAMM-RUDMAN BUDGET
CUTS. THE QUESTIONS ARE DESIGNED TO PINPOINT HOW CUTS
WERE PRIORITIZED, FIRST BY FUNCTIONAL AREA, AND THEN BY
EXPENSE ELEMENT WITHIN EACH AREA.
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16. PLEASE INDICATE THE ORDER IN WHICH CATEGORIES WERE





MAINTENANCE OF REAL PROPERTY (MRP)
UTILITY OPERATIONS
SUPPORT CATEGORIES
ALL CATEGORIES WERE CUT
OTHER (PLEASE SPECIFIY)
17. IF MISSION OPERATIONS WERE CUT, WHICH OF THE
FOLLOWING EXPENSE ELEMENTS, WITHIN THAT CATEGORY WERE
CUT?
_ CIVILIAN PERSONNEL
_ TRAVEL OF PERSONNEL
_ UTILITIES AND RENT
_ PURCHASED EQUIPMENT, MAINTENANCE




_ DIFFERENTIATION WAS NOT POSSIBLE, ALL ELEMENTS
CUT
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18. IF ADMINISTRATION WAS CUT. WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING
EXPENSE ELEMENTS, WITHIN THAT CATEGORY WERE CUT?
_ CIVILIAN PERSONNEL
_ TRAVEL OF PERSONNEL
_ UTILITIES AND RENT
_ PURCHASED EQUIPMENT, MAINTENANCE




_ DIFFERENTIATION WAS NOT POSSIBLE, ALL ELEMENTS
CUT
19. IF MAINTENANCE OF MATERIAL WAS CUT, WHICH OF THI
FOLLOWING EXPENSE ELEMENTS, WITHIN THAT CATEGORY WERE
CUT?
_ CIVILIAN PERSONNEL
_ TRAVEL OF PERSONNEL
_ UTILITIES AND RENT
_ PURCHASED EQUIPMENT, MAINTENANCE




_ DIFFERENTIATION WAS NOT POSSIBLE, ALL ELEMENTS
CUT
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20. IF BASE SERVICES WERE CUT, WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING
EXPENSE ELEMENTS, WITHIN THAT CATEGORY WERE CUT?
_ CIVILIAN PERSONNEL
_ TRAVEL OF PERSONNEL
_ UTILITIES AND RENT
_ PURCHASED EQUIPMENT, MAINTENANCE




_ DIFFERENTIATION WAS NOT POSSIBLE, ALL ELEMENTS
CUT
21. IF MRP WAS CUT, WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING EXPENSE
ELEMENTS, WITHIN THAT CATEGORY WERE CUT?
__ CIVILIAN PERSONNEL
_ TRAVEL OF PERSONNEL
_ UTILITIES AND RENT
_ PURCHASED EQUIPMENT, MAINTENANCE




_ DIFFERENTIATION WAS NOT POSSIBLE, ALL ELEMENTS
CUT
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22. IF UTILITIES WERE CUT. WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING
EXPENSE ELEMENTS, WITHIN THAT CATEGORY WERE CUT?
_ CIVILIAN PERSONNEL
_ TRAVEL OF PERSONNEL
_ UTILITIES AND RENT
_ PURCHASED EQUIPMENT, MAINTENANCE




_ DIFFERENTIATION WAS NOT POSSIBLE, ALL ELEMENTS
CUT
23. IF SUPPORT CATEGORIES WERE CUT, WHICH OF THE
FOLLOWING EXPENSE ELEMENTS, WITHIN THOSE CATEGORIES WERJ
CUT?
_ CIVILIAN PERSONNEL
_ TRAVEL OF PERSONNEL
_ UTILITIES AND RENT
_ PURCHASED EQUIPMENT, MAINTENANCE




. _ DIFFERENTIATION WAS NOT POSSIBLE, ALL ELEMENTS
CUT
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24. IF FUNCTIONAL CATEGORIES/ACTIVITIES WERE REINSTATED
AFTER BEING CUT OR REDUCED, PLEASE INDICATE IN WHAT ORDER
THEY WERE RESTORED WITH A 1,2, 3, ETC.:
_ MISSION OPERATIONS
_ ADMINISTRATION
_ MAINTENANCE OF MATERIAL
_ BASE SERVICES
_ MAINTENANCE OF REAL PROPERTY
_ UTILITY OPERATIONS
_ SUPPORT CATEGORIES
25. HOW HAS YOUR ACTIVITY'S FINANCIAL PLANNING FUNCTION
FARED IN THE FACE OF FY-86 CUTS?
A. PLANNING STAFFS HAVE BEEN CUT
B. PLANNING STAFFS HAVE BEEN INCREASED
C. PLANNING STAFFS HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED
D. PLANNING STAFFS HAVE NOT INCREASED, BUT MORE
RESPONSIBILITY CENTER HEADS ARE NOW INVOLVED IN
ACTIVE PLANNING
26. THE FINANCIAL PLANNING STAFF AT YOUR ACTIVITY:
A. IS ADEQUATE
B. WAS PREVIOUSLY ADEQUATE, BUT NOW, IN THE
CURRENT FISCAL CLIMATE, IS INADEQUATE
C. IS ADEQUATE, BUT LIMITED IN ITS ABILITY TO
CONDUCT FORMAL PROGRAM ANALYSIS NECESSARY TO
MAKE THE "HARD DECISIONS" NOW REQUIRED
D. HAS ALWAYS BEEN INADEQUATE
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27. TO WHAT EXTENT HAS YOUR INTERACTION WITH THE
COMMANDING OFFICER REGARDING FY-86 BUDGET AND PLANNING




C. REMAINED THE SAME
D. DECREASED
E. SIGNIFICANTLY DECREASED
28. TO WHAT EXTENT HAS YOUR LIAISON WITH DEPARTMENT
HEADS REGARDING FY-86 BUDGET AND PLANNING FOR FY-87/88
BEEN AFFECTED BY THE CLIMATE OF DEFICIT REDUCTION?
A SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED.
B INCREASED
C REMAINED THE SAME
n DECREASED
F SIGNIFICANTLY DECREASED
29. IN CONSIDERING MEANS TO REDUCE COSTS, NEWLY
INSTITUTED PROGRAMS WERE.
A. CONSIDERED PART OF THE BASE AND EVALUATED ON
INDIVIDUAL MERITS
B. WERE CUT BEFORE OLDER, MORE ESTABLISHED
PROGRAMS
C. CUT AT THE MARGINS ALONG V/1TH OTHER PROGRAMS
D. OTHER
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30. HAS THE SPECTER OF REDUCED, OR AT LEAST NON-







31. THOUGH THE FINAL AMOUNT OF THE FY-87 BUDGET IS STILL
NOT CERTAIN, IT SEEMS EVIDENT THAT TO MEET THE DEFICIT
REDUCTION TARGETS, DOD WILL RECEIVE LESS THAN REQUESTED
IN THE PRESIDENT'S BUDGET. WHAT DEGREE OF
GUIDANCE/PLANNING HAVE BEEN RECEIVED/CARRIED OUT IN VIEW
OF THE HIGH POTENTIAL FOR FURTHER CUTS IN OPERATING
BUDGETS?
GUIDANCE RECEIVED PLANNING CONDUCTED
A. EXTENSIVE A. EXTENSIVE
B. MODERATE B. MODERATE
C. LIMITED C. LIMITED
D. NONE D. NONE
32. DO YOU FEEL THE INEVITABLE IMPACT OF THE FY-88 DEFICIT
TARGET V/AS CONSIDERED IN FORMULATING THE FY-88 BUDGET?
A. YES — FORMALLY
(FOR INSTANCE, AS EVIDENCED BY REDUCED CONTROL
NUMBERS)
B. YES — INFORMALLY (AS EVIDENCED AT MEETINGS, BY
TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS, ETC.)
C. YES — AT LEAST AT THE ACTIVITY LEVEL
D. NO — OR NOT APPARENT
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33. IF MARGINAL CUTS WERE MADE ON PROGRAMS TO
ACCOMMODATE THE FY-86 BUDGET REDUCTIONS, CAN ADDITIONAL
MARGINAL CUTS BE IMPLEMENTED TO MEET ANTICIPATED BUDGET
REDUCTIONS/LACK OF OPERATING BUDGET GROWTH IN FY-87/88?
A. YES
B. IN SOME, BUT NOT ALL, CASES
C. NO
34. IF MARGINAL CUTS WILL NOT SUFFICE TO MEET ANTICIPATED
FY-87/88 BUDGET LEVELS, WHAT OPTIONS ARE BEING
CONSIDERED?
A. HIGH COST PROGRAMS WILL BE CUT
B. PROGRAMS WITH LOW COST TO BENEFIT RATIOS WILL
BE CUT
C. PROGRAMS NOT MANDATED BY THE ACTIVITY'S
MISSION WILL BE REDUCED/ELIMINATED
D. PERSONNEL INVOLVED IN NON MISSION-ESSENTIAL
TASKS WILL BE CUT
E. OTHER
35. HOW HAVE THE GRAMM-RUDMAN FY-86 BUDGET CUTS
AFFECTED THE LEVEL OF YOUR COMMAND'S FINANCIAL
REPORTING?
INCREASED REPORTING WITHIN YOUR ACTIVITY
HAD NO AFFECT ON REPORTING WITHIN YOUR
ACTIVITY
DECREASED REPORTING WITHIN YOUR ACTIVITY
B.
INCREASED REPORTING TO HIGHER ECHELONS
HAD NO AFFECT ON REPORTING TO HIGHER
ECHELONS
DECREASED REPORTING TO HIGHER ECHELONS
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36. THE AMOUNT OF FINANCIAL GUIDANCE FROM THE
CLAIMANT/SUB-CLAIMANT LEVEL HAS AS A RESULT
OF THE GRAMM-RUDMAN PROCESS IN GENERAL.
A. INCREASED SIGNIFICANTLY
B. INCREASED
C. NOT BEEN AFFECTED
D. DECREASED
E. DECREASED SIGN1FICNATLY
37. THE LEVEL OF FINANCIAL CONTROL EXERCISED BY THE
CLAIMANT/SUB-CLAIMANT AS A RESULT OF THE
GRAMM-RUDMAN PROCESS IN GENERAL.
A. INCREASED SIGNIFICANTLY
IB. INCREASED
C. NOT BEEN AFFECTED
D. DECREASED
E. DECREASED SIGNIF1CNATLY
38. THE LEVEL OF INFORMATION YOU RECEIVED PERTAINING TO






39. THE TIMELINESS OF THE INFORMATION YOU RECEIVED







40. HAS THE OVERALL LEVEL OF BUDGET AWARENESS AT THE
RESPONSIBILITY CENTERS WITHIN YOUR ACTIVITY AS A
RESULT OF THE GRAMM-RUDMAN?
A. SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED
B. INCREASED
C. STAYED THE SAME
D. DECREASED
E. SIGNIFICANTLY DECREASED
41. SINCE 01 MARCH, WHILE OPERATING IN A CLIMATE OF
INCREASED FISCAL AUSTERITY, THE DECISION MAKING PROCESSES
HAVE:
A. BECOME MORE DIFFICULT
B. TAKEN MORE TIME THAN WHEN MONEY WAS NOT AS
TIGHT
C. NOT BEEN AFFECTED
D. BECOME EASIER
E. TAKEN LESS TIME THAN WHEN MONEY WAS MOT AS
TIGHT
F. BOTH A AND B ABOVE
G. BOTH D AND E ABOVE
42. RELIANCE ON "RATIONAL" DECISION MAKING TOOLS SUCH AS
LINEAR PROGRAMMING, MODELING, AND OTHER MANAGEMENT
SCIENCE TECHNIQUES HAS DURING THE PLANNING FOR FY-86
CUTS AND FOR UPCOMING BUDGET SUBMISSIONS.
A. INCREASED
B. NOT BEEN AFFECTED
C. DECREASED
D. HAVE NEVER BEEN AND ARE NOT NOW BEING USED
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43. "IN IMPLEMENTING THE FY-86 CUTS, EMPLOYEE IDEAS FOR


















45. OF PARTICULAR INTEREST IN THIS STUDY IS THE DECISION
MAKING PROCESS DURING PERIODS OF "CUTBACK MANAGEMENT."
YOUR COMMENTS ON THE FOLLOWING SUBJECTS WOULD PROVIDE
KEEN INSIGHT INTO THE PROCESS. PLEASE COMMENT:
A. ON THE QUALITY/LEVEL/TREND (S) OF THE STRATEGIC
PLANNING FUNCTION AT YOUR ACTIVITY IN THE FACE OF REDUCED
RESOURCES
B. CONTRAST THE DECISION MAKING PROCESS DURING
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